Hurdling the CMO Challenges and Gaps

by Lt Col Rolando Joselito D Bautista (INF) GSC PA

The AFP formulated various operational concepts aimed to address the communist terrorist movement (CTM) which is considered as the most potent threat in the country. However, for the past 40 years, we could not still banner our success against the CTM because the threat continues to exist by utilizing other sectors of society to advance their revolutionary struggle.

It is very evident that there is a gap in the implementation of the TRIAD components in addressing the CTM. Gen Esperon, the former CSAFP said, “I recognized that past opportunities to exploit the vulnerability of the CTM have not been maximized. Our past experiences show that we have fallen short of our best efforts, and failed to dedicate our significant resources in winning the perception war against the CTs.”

True enough, while we have good application of the Intelligence and Operations Components in our campaign, the other component which is CMO seems to be defective. In essence, the balance of TRIAD approach is not fully achieved. Internal security operations in the context of the AFP, therefore, do not refer only to military operations against armed insurgents but also to include operations that are not purely military in nature but are meant to address the other dimensions of insurgency.

The Command is not spared from the underlying challenges and gaps in CMO which has a significant effect in its overall campaign against the CTM in the AOR. Some of these internal and external factors that are could be attributed to these gaps are the following:

a. Lack of appreciation of the commanders of the CMO component as tool to address insurgency.

While we have always had the strategic upper hand in terms of military capabilities, some commanders tend to be a little complacent in maximizing the potentials of CMO to achieve our ISO goals. There seems to be a low regard for CMO as a “non-core” responsibility, a kind of a second-rate military task. Some commanders are stuck with the usual “quantifiable” paradigm of kill ratios, firearms gained/lost and barangays cleared. This would have been justifiable if the losses being inflicted are substantially weakening the armed component to the extent that they cannot interfere with development efforts. This is the kind of mindset that we want to change for “insurgency is a multi-dimensional problem requiring multi-faceted solution.”

b. Lack of measurable parameters to determine the effectiveness of CMO efforts.

The continuing struggle of CMO to be co-equal with the other components of the TRIAD is further hindered by the natural bias of commanders for combat and intelligence because of their readily measurable parameters for success. Until this time, there is no established yardstick that will measure the effectiveness of CMO as a component of TRIAD in the dismantling of a priority guerilla front. It has been observed that there are many CMO activities that are being conducted by units. But the question is, “are these activities support the ISO campaign of the Command?” Unfortunately, some resources used in CMO activities are wasted because from the start of the activity the objectives are not clearly defined.

c. Lack of convergence of the Civilian Sector's Effort and Commitment

Civilian agencies should be made to understand that they too have roles and responsibilities to fulfill in relation to the fight against insurgency. It must be realized that insurgency is a multi-faceted threat which requires solutions that are beyond at the military can provide. Following the holistic approach in addressing insurgency, some civilian agencies lack the enthusiasm and the drive to contribute to ISO conducted by the AFP. One of the main reasons for this is that since the AFP is taking the lead role in the eradication of insurgency, these civilian agencies think that they only perform a support role when in fact they have a big part in addressing the problem.

There is, therefore a gap in the synergy of efforts of ISO. Because other civilian agencies seem unable to fully realize the gravity of the insurgent problem, their contributions to ISO could not be optimized. It should be stressed, however, that the contributions of the civilian sector would not provide the desired impact if these are not interlinked with the actions of the military. Closer coordination with civilian agencies should be pursued. Even if the AFP addresses the gaps internal to its organizations, insurgency will continue to linger if the civilian government will not exert the necessary and commensurate effort to address the other non-military dimensions of insurgency. At the end of the day, discontent and the resort to arms can only be appeased by development, justice and equity.

Our CMO Accomplishment

The Command punctuated its bold performance in CMO with tangible landmarks and contemporary accomplishment. For this year, the CMO efforts fully support the Command's campaign enabling it to surpass the challenges and gaps that were identified. The CMO activities are in coordination with various agencies of the government and other ISO stakeholders in the AOR.

The most significant accomplishment of the Command is the spearheading of the creation of the Regional ISO Convergence Office (RISOCO) as stipulated in Section 5 of Executive Order Number 739 (Reorganizing the Regional Peace and Order Council). The RISOCO shall act as the focal point on the convergence and orchestration of Internal Security Operations (ISO) efforts of civil authorities and agencies, military and police. It will have the following objectives:

a. To harness interagency coordination and convergence of efforts in focus areas in the region;

b. To monitor and ensure the delivery and realization of government programs/projects in focus areas; and

c. To identify focus areas and determine the government programs/projects needed that will significantly reduce the root causes of insurgency, in consultation with local ISO stakeholders.

It is imperative for the Command to ensure that the RISOCO will be able to harness the effective and efficient synchronization of efforts and responses of the involved ISO stakeholders in the focus area. And this will be a challenge to the Command on how to make it work.

Other accomplishments of the Command are depicted in the following areas: support to peace process; environmental preservation and protection; disaster relief, rescue and rehabilitation operations; civil affairs and community relations; and security awareness advocacy, all of which are geared towards closer civil and military ties.

Support to Peace Process

The Command was able to effect the surrender of 39 former CTs. Likewise, they surrendered 16 high-powered and low-powered firearms as a gesture of their sincere intention to set aside arms struggle. Although the Command is focused in crashing the CTs through its right-hand effort, it is also serious of promoting the culture of peace by encouraging CPP/NPA/NDF regular members to return to the mainstream society and live a normal life together with their families.

Environmental Preservation and Protection

The Command continues to advocate Environmental Preservation and Protection Programs in its AOR. Regular tree-planting activities resulted in 26,170 trees planted. On the other hand, the Division has also been deputized to assist in the implementation of forestry laws such that line units have been tasked to conduct checkpoints and inspections for illegally-cut logs and lumber resulting in the confiscation of 10,150 board feet of assorted illegally-cut logs and lumber.

Disaster Relief, Rescue and Rehabilitation

With the occurrence of various calamities, the Division caused a total of nine rescue operations which were carried out all over the AOR. Line units also assisted in the evacuation of 6,746 calamity victims to safer areas in different disaster sites side by side with other government agencies and non-government organizations.

Civil Affairs and Community Relations

A total of 173 MEDCAPs was conducted by the Command with 22,165 beneficiaries. Likewise, 19 blood donating activities were initiated by line units that resulted to the extraction of 171,000 cc of different blood types. The Command was also instrumental in the construction and repair of 42 projects in remote barangays to include among others, construction of water system, repair of schools and roads.

Security Awareness Advocacy

The Command conducted 262 Security Awareness Information Drives to the different sectors of society. The intent is to make the target audience aware of the plans and activities of the CPP/NPA/NDF in Region 11 for the next three years. By doing this, the Command was able to generate their support and mobilize them in the fight against the CTs.

Conclusion

The various accomplishments of the Command in CMO for year 2008 bespeak of its seriousness to make CMO a relevant component of the TRIAD. Experience will tell that there is paradigm shift on the strategy of the enemy by taking advantage of material, political and psychological resources available to them. Battles are fought not only in the field, but most importantly in venues where public opinion is shaped. Moreover, success can no longer be measured by body count, because to endure, it shall entail winning the hearts and minds of the people.

The CMO personnel of the Command still need to improve and enhance their competencies to sustain their effectiveness even as fresh challenges appear in ISO. These challenges of course, is viewed by the Command as opportunities to further consolidate its gains and pursue better measures in the future. In essence, the Command will look beyond its traditional role. Combat alone is a necessary yet insufficient component of a holistic solution that the present endeavor requires.